“It is quite conceivable that judgment is a very complicated phenomenon”

Dorothy Wrinch, nonsense and the multiple relation theory of judgement

Bibliographic Data

ID21597900
AuthorsGiulia Felappi (0000-0002-0110-6371, University of Southampton, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume30
Issue2
Pages250-266
Publication date2022-03-04
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2021.1888694
OpenAlexW3136684319
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited33

In her paper “On the Nature of Judgment”, published in 1919 in Mind, Dorothy Wrinch aimed at understanding how Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement might be made to work. In this paper we will focus on Wrinch’s claim that on the theory it is impossible, as it should be, to judge nonsense. After having presented the prima facie objection to the theory created by nonsense and what we can take her solution to such a problem to imply (§1), we will show how Wrinch can resist the two main objections that have been moved to such a solution, whether as explicitly attributed to Wrinch or discussed without mentioning her. The conclusion will be, contrary to what one might be tempted to think, that even if there might be reasons to take the multiple relation theory as doomed, Wrinch was the first to show us that nonsense is not one of those reasons

Epistemology · Judgement · Nonsense · Phenomenon · Physics · Prima facie · Computer Science · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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