Conscience, conviction, and moral autonomy in Fichte’s ethics
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21597901 |
|---|---|
| Authors | TIMOTHY BROWNLEE (Xavier University, corresponding author), Timothy L Brownlee (Xavier University) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 626-645 |
| Publication date | 2022-07-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2022.2077301 |
| OpenAlex | W4281770799 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
According to Kant, a certain kind of knowledge is essential to the achievement of moral autonomy. In order for an action to be obligatory, it must be possible for me to know not only what I have a duty to do, but also the ground of my obligation. While Fichte too identifies the importance of this epistemic dimension of moral autonomy, some recent accounts of Fichte’s ethics undermine it, either by severing the link between conscience and moral knowledge, as Michelle Kosch does, or by holding that the grounds of our obligations are not knowable by all, but only the transcendental philosopher, as Owen Ware does. I argue that we can save the connection between conscience and moral knowledge by distinguishing between conscience and conviction, but that there is an abiding tension in Fichte’s ethics between the philosophical account of the ground of our duties and the discursive activity of justifying our actions to one another
Autonomy · Conscience · Conviction · Duty · Epistemology · Kantian ethics · Moral obligation · Morality · Obligation · Political science · Theology · Transcendental number · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |