On going the market one better

Economic Market Design and the Contradictions of Building Markets for Public Purposes

Bibliographic Data

ID2159794
AuthorsEdward Nik-Khah (0000-0001-5840-8744, Roanoke College, 221 College Lane, Salem, VA 24153, United States), Philip Mirowski (0000-0002-0261-8934, University of Notre Dame, 452 Geddes Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, United States.)
Year2019
Volume48
Issue2
Pages268-294
Publication date2019-04-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomy and Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0308-5147 • E-ISSN: 1469-5766
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03085147.2019.1576431
OpenAlexW2960654664
LanguageEN
Citations received23
References cited45

Before the 1970s, no economists claimed an ability to fix markets; now economists make markets in a smorgasbord of shapes and flavours. Secondary commentary on market design fails to appreciate how momentous this change was. We summarize the development of market design through its first attempted application—auctions for airport slots. Economists reconceptualized markets from generic allocation processes to boutique information processors. The new view entailed that economists would skew markets towards the outcomes favoured for a client. Yet they continued appealing to a unified theory of markets and the associated remit to act as neutral arbiters for everyone's welfare. Inbuilt political bias contradicts the older claims of economists to stand outside the economic process. This contradictory stance has direct implications for the 'performativity' literature

Business · Common value auction · Economics · Market economy · Market system · Microeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Performativity · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Sociology · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Marketing

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