The experience and knowledge of time, through Russell and Moore

Bibliographic Data

ID21597950
AuthorsJack Shardlow (0000-0003-0851-1545, University of Warwick, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume31
Issue2
Pages231-250
Publication date2023-03-04
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09608788.2022.2079608
OpenAlexW4283464522
LanguageEN
References cited25

This paper develops the account of our experience and knowledge of time put forward by Russell in his Theory of Knowledge manuscript. While Russell ultimately abandons the project after it receives severe criticism from Wittgenstein (though several chapters derived from it appear as articles in The Monist), in producing this manuscript time, and particularly the notion of the present time, play a central role in Russell’s account of experience. In the present discussion, I propose to focus largely on Russell’s writing in 1912–3, comparing this with some of the remarks made about memory by Moore in 1910–11. My motivation is twofold. First as a matter of scholarship, to reveal an original interpretation of Russell’s notion of immediate memory and of his view of our experience and knowledge of time over this period. Second as a matter of philosophical curiosity. There has been an increase in interest in temporal experience in contemporary discussions of the philosophy of mind, from memory and the imagination to the temporal aspects of perceptual experience. Russell’s writing in 1912–3 provides us with a philosophically interesting account of temporal experience which has points of contact with contemporary debates

Criticism · Curiosity · Epistemology · Literature · Monism · Perception · Scholarship · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology · Social Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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