Hobbes and the ‘great deception of sense’
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21597975 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Walter Ott (0000-0002-3426-5416, University of Virginia, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 779-796 |
| Publication date | 2025-07-04 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal for the History of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0960-8788 • E-ISSN: 1469-3526 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09608788.2024.2385674 |
| OpenAlex | W4402407431 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
In Human Nature, Hobbes argues for what I call the ‘Great Deception Thesis': “whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only”. I argue that both the thesis and Hobbes’ arguments for it have been misunderstood. Rather than arguing for indirect realism or a primary/secondary quality distinction, Hobbes claims that no sensory experience resembles its object. I conclude by showing how Hobbes can account for the usefulness of images even in the absence of any resemblance between those images and the objects that cause them. If I am right, Hobbes presents a distinctive and intriguing theory of perception, one that emphasizes the dynamic nature of experience
Deception · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Self-deception · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Political Theology and Sovereignty · Psychology · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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