When Suicide is not a Self -Killing

Advance Decisions and Psychological Discontinuity—Part II

Bibliographic Data

ID21598209
AuthorsSuzanne E Dowie (0000-0001-7267-239X, University of Glasgow, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume34
Issue3
Pages467-478
Publication date2025-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0963-1801 • E-ISSN: 1469-2147
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0963180124000239
PMID38720656
OpenAlexW4396762676
LanguageEN
References cited16

Derek Parfit’s view of personal identity raises questions about whether advance decisions refusing life-saving treatment should be honored in cases where a patient loses psychological continuity; it implies that these advance decisions would not be self -determining at all. However, rather than accepting that an unknown metaphysical ‘further fact’ underpins agential unity, one can accept Parfit’s view but offer a different account of what it implies morally. Part II of this article argues that contractual obligations provide a moral basis for honoring advance decisions refusing life-saving and/or life-sustaining medical treatment; advance decisions have similarities to contracts, such as life insurance policies and will-contracts, that come into effect when the psychological discontinuity is through death

Aesthetics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Metaphysics · Personal identity · Self · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Patient Dignity and Privacy · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access