Two Views of Vulnerability in the Evolution of Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying Law

Bibliographic Data

ID21598247
AuthorsSarah J Lazin (0009-0000-3897-559X, University of Ottawa), Jennifer A Chandler (0000-0001-9471-4626, University of Ottawa, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume32
Issue1
Pages105-117
Publication date2023-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0963-1801 • E-ISSN: 1469-2147
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0963180121000943
PMID36503576
OpenAlexW4311154939
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited5

Canada is six years into a new era of legalized medical assistance in dying (MAiD). The law continues to evolve, following a pattern in which Canadian courts rule that legal restrictions on eligibility for MAiD are unconstitutional and Parliament responds by gradually expanding eligibility for MAiD. The central tension underlying this dialogue between courts and government has focused on two conceptions of how to best promote and protect the interests of people who are vulnerable by virtue of intolerable and irremediable suffering due to an illness, disease, or disability. Do we, as a society, have a duty to protect vulnerable people from seeking certain medical procedures that are contrary to their interests, as those are perceived by others? Or do we have a duty to uphold their rights to autonomy, including the right to make choices within a range that may be constrained by many factors, some of which may be socially unjust? This is a recurrent problem in bioethics and medical law, which we explore through the lens of how Canadian courts and Parliament have grappled with defining eligibility for MAiD

Autonomy · Bioethics · Duty · Medical law · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Palliative Care and End-of-Life Issues · Public Health Policies and Education

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