Can Knowledge Itself Justify Harmful Research
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21598508 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeff Sebo (0000-0002-8997-3217), David Degrazia (0000-0002-1776-6569) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 302-307 |
| Publication date | 2020-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0963-1801 • E-ISSN: 1469-2147 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0963180119001087 |
| PMID | 32159483 |
| OpenAlex | W3011617748 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 3 |
In our paper, we argue for three necessary conditions for morally permissible animal research: (1) an assertion (or expectation) of sufficient net benefit, (2) a worthwhile-life condition, and (3) a no-unnecessary-harm/qualified-basic-needs condition. 1 We argue that these conditions are necessary, without taking a position on whether they are jointly sufficient. In their excellent commentary on our paper, Matthias Eggel, Carolyn Neuhaus, and Herwig Grimm (hereafter, the authors) argue for a friendly amendment to one of our three conditions. 2 In particular, they argue for replacing the first condition—expectation of sufficient net benefit (ESNB)—with an expectation of knowledge production (EKP). 3 In this reply, we will explain why we are open to this proposed amendment, but not yet convinced
Assertion · Economics · Epistemology · Harm · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Sociology · Animal testing and alternatives · Computer Science · Ethics in Clinical Research · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.25 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2022 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |