The Moral Status of Cognitively Enhanced Monkeys and Other Novel Beings

Bibliographic Data

ID21598521
AuthorsGardar Árnason (0000-0002-9667-7096, University of Tübingen, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume30
Issue3
Pages492-503
Publication date2021-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0963-1801 • E-ISSN: 1469-2147
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0963180120001048
PMID34109929
OpenAlexW3166408409
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited42

The discussion about the moral status of novel beings tends to focus on artificial intelligence, robots, and other man-made systems. We should, however, also consider a likelier kind of novel beings: animals that are genetically modified to develop human-like cognitive capabilities. This paper focuses on the possibility of conferring human characteristics on nonhuman primates (NHPs) in the context of neuroscientific research. It first discusses the use of NHPs for neuroscientific research and then, second, describes recent developments that promise to revolutionize the field and how that may lead to NHPs attaining human-like cognitive capabilities. Third, an account of moral status is developed to ground the central claim, that making the NHP brain more human-like is unproblematic as long as the NHPs do not become persons. In conclusion, this paper discusses the implications for the moral status of cognitively enhanced NHPs, as well as the implications for other novel beings

Cognition · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Non-human · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Neuroscience · Pluripotent Stem Cells Research · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access