How Much Does Suffering Matter

Bibliographic Data

ID21598534
AuthorsBrent M Kious (0000-0003-3477-5659, University of Utah, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume35
Issue1
Pages1-12
Publication date2026-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0963-1801 • E-ISSN: 1469-2147
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s096318012400080x
PMID39834267
OpenAlexW4406681890
LanguageEN
References cited20

Ethicists frequently suppose that suffering has special moral significance. It is often claimed that a main goal of medicine—perhaps its primary goal—is the alleviation of human suffering. Following Eric Cassell and others, this essay considers suffering understood as the experience of distress—negative emotions—in response to threats to something that one cares about. It examines whether, on this value-based account of suffering, we should accept the claim that suffering has special moral significance. It argues that we should not: suffering does not add significantly to the value of other human interests and rarely changes our moral obligations itself; it merely seems to have strong moral relevance because it often attends to interests that matter. This is because negative emotions themselves have only limited moral significance, which is due to the fact that their primary mental role is to indicate to us the relative importance of non-emotional goods

Epistemology · Political science · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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