Saving the Last Person from Radical Scepticism

How to Justify Attributions of Intrinsic Value to Nature without Intuition or Empirical Evidence

Bibliographic Data

ID21598809
AuthorsAlexander Pho (0000-0002-3791-5947, University of Wisconsin–Madison, corresponding author), Allen Thompson (Oregon State University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume32
Issue1
Pages91-111
Publication date2023-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEnvironmental Values (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0963-2719 • E-ISSN: 1752-7015
PublisherSAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.3197/096327122x16386102424010
OpenAlexW4212951981
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited18

Toby Svoboda (2011, 2015) argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to nature because we can never have evidence that any part of non-human nature has intrinsic value. We argue that, at best, Svoboda's position leaves us with uncertainty about whether there is intrinsic value in the non-human natural world. This uncertainty, however, together with reason to believe that at least some non-human natural entities would possess intrinsic value if anything does, leaves us in a position to acquire evidence that non-human nature has intrinsic value. We appeal to Michael Huemer's (2013) Probabilistic Reasons Principle to argue that we have direct reasons to not act in ways destructive to non-human nature, even if this reason is defeasible. Hence, if having intrinsic value just is being a source of direct reasons, it also implies that non-human nature has intrinsic value

Appeal · Attribution · Economics · Empirical evidence · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Intuition · Political science · Positive economics · Skepticism · Computer Science · Environmental Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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