Gerhard Krüger's Platonic critique of Martin Heidegger
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21602936 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Antoine Pageau‐st‐hilaire (0000-0001-5543-2060, University of Chicago Chicago Illinois USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 967-981 |
| Publication date | 2023-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12833 |
| OpenAlex | W4310055013 |
| Language | DE |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 13 |
This paper examines Gerhard Krüger's interpretation of Plato in light of Martin Heidegger's Destruktion of the Greeks and critique of Platonism. I argue that Krüger's new reading of Plato should be understood as a critique of Heidegger's understanding of Platonism, and thereby as a broader critique of Heidegger's thoughts on Western metaphysics and the history of Being ( Seinsgeschichte ). The force and originality of Krüger's response to Heidegger consist in the fact that Krüger's Plato anticipates Heidegger's critique of Platonism. Krüger thus contends that Plato (1) does not allow the understanding of truth as correctness ( Übereinstimmung ) to supplant the understanding of truth as disclosedness ( Unverborgenheit ), (2) understands and displays philosophy's dependence upon prereflexive attunements ( Stimmungen ); (3) appreciates the intricate relation between Being and temporality. In sum, Krüger's Plato is not guilty of Seinsvergessenheit , and rather opens up new ways for an authentic meditation on Being and on the human way toward an understanding of Being
Art · Contemplation · Epistemology · Greeks · Hegelianism · Metaphysics · Platonism · Temporality · Classics · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |