Phenomenology, anti‐realism, and the knowability paradox
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21602974 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James Kinkaid (0000-0003-4834-7647, Department of Philosophy Boston University Boston Massachusetts USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 1010-1027 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12762 |
| OpenAlex | W4210255576 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 34 |
Husserl endorses ideal verificationism , the claim that there is a necessary correlation between truth and the ideal possibility of experience. This puts him in the company of semantic anti‐realists like Dummett, Tennant, and Wright who endorse the knowability thesis that all truths are knowable. Unfortunately, there is a simple, seductive, and troubling argument due to Alonzo Church and Frederic Fitch that the knowability thesis collapses into the omniscience thesis that all truths are known. Phenomenologists should be worried. I assess the damage by surveying responses that may be open to Husserl. In particular, I explore whether Husserl ought to have adopted intuitionistic logic and motivate a restriction of ideal verificationism on phenomenological grounds
Epistemology · Realism · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |