Self‐Knowledge and the Capacity to Judge

Dados Bibliográficos

ID21603005
AutoresMatthew Parrott (0000-0002-8951-4600, St Hilda's College Oxford, autor correspondente)
Ano2026
Volume34
Fascículo2
Páginas407-422
Data de publicação2026-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.70038
OpenAlexW4416057264
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas64

Several philosophers have sought to explain certain features of self‐knowledge our beliefs on the basis of the relation which holds between them and our judgments. Typically, these philosophers presuppose that there is just a single relation between these, for instance the relation of identity. In this essay, I shall claim that this presupposition is mistaken. Instead, I shall argue that because our capacity to judge has two functions, there are two different types of relation which hold between judgment and belief. In the final section, I show how this dual relations account can resolve an epistemological puzzle that is raised by ‘transparent’ self‐knowledge of one's own beliefs

Presupposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science