Demanding more of Strawsonian accountability theory
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 21603033 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Daniel Telech (0000-0003-0419-4423, The Polonsky Academy for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Science Van Leer Jerusalem Institute Jerusalem Israel, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2020 |
| Volumen | 28 |
| Número | 4 |
| Páginas | 926-941 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2020-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12527 |
| OpenAlex | W3007767049 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 6 |
| Referencias citadas | 57 |
A neglected and non‐trivial problem exists for a central cluster of Strawsonian accountability theories of moral responsibility, namely those that, following Gary Watson, understand the reactive attitudes to be implicit forms of moral address , particularly moral demand. The problem consists in the joint acceptance of two claims: (a) Accountability is a matter of agents holding one another to moral demands, and (b) accountability is a view of blame and praise . I label joint acceptance of these claims the Strawsonian's demand dogma . Symptomatic of a larger tendency among responsibility theorists to focus on blame to the neglect of its positive counterpart, the demand dogma saddles the Strawsonian with an impoverished and ultimately untenable view of praise. This is because moral demand occupies a dual role on the Strawsonian's view of blame, one that it is incapable of occupying for praise. For, demands figure not only in the contents of blame responses; demand typifies the form of these responses themselves. That is, reactive attitudes of blame, unlike those of praise, implicitly make demands of their targets. The force of this problem is highlighted by considering the inadequacy of various strategies for shoehorning “demand” into our conception of praise. If reactive attitudes generally are incipient forms of moral address, praise‐manifesting attitudes must communicate something other than demand. Though primarily critical, this paper invites Strawsonian responsibility theorists to give renewed attention to the foundations of the proposal that the reactive attitudes are incipiently communicative, focusing this time on the form of address that lies at the heart of praise
Accountability · Blame · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Moral responsibility · Political science · Positive economics · Praise · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
An essay on moral responsibility
Living without Free Will
Responsibility and Control
Conversation and Responsibility
Responsibility from the Margins
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
Emotions
IV-Culpability and Ignorance
Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame
Responsibility for Attitudes
The suberogatory
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability
Communities of Respect
Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense
Freedom within Reason
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility
On Minding Your Own Business
How to Blame People Responsibly
Skepticism about Moral Responsibility
Reactive Attitudes as Communicative Entities
Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness
Social Constraints On Moral Address
Understanding standing
Oxford Studies in Metaethics
Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons
To have and to hold
Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest
Is gratitude a moral affect
The Varieties of Retributive Experience
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,2 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Velocidad de citación | recent |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 6 |