Hegel's “no” and “yes” on the question
Is Hegelian recognition second‐personal
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603059 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Dina Emundts (0009-0000-1224-3390, Freie Universität zu Berlin; Institut für Philosophie Berlin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-06 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.13061 |
| OpenAlex | W4408343042 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 10 |
This paper discusses a thesis put forward by Robert Stern. The thesis is that Hegel's conception of forgiveness should not be read as something in which the ethics of the second person is expressed. The paper develops an alternative reading of forgiveness that takes Stern's objections to a direct second personal approach of forgiveness seriously. Forgiveness is second‐personal and we have the authority to forgive if we at the same time deny our individual standpoint as absolute. We thus get a concept of second‐personal action which implies that the authority is grounded in society or the community and not in the person as an individual
Epistemology · Hegelianism · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |