Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences
Affective imaginings and affective perceptions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603111 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Mitchell (0000-0002-7008-4655, Department of Philosophy University of Manchester Manchester UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 307-325 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12648 |
| OpenAlex | W3151997462 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 34 |
A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self‐standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions, whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object—because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects—nonetheless need not differ qua emotion‐type. This leads to the same‐emotional attitude, different content claim: It is possible to have the same emotional attitude toward a range of (different) contents, as provided by different cognitive bases. This paper argues that this claim is mistaken. By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional‐attitude, different content claim is challenged. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean‐Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue that we should recognize a distinct class of emotion types, which I call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast with emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense‐perceptual experiences (affective perceptions). The contrast turns on the way the different contents across these cases modify the attitudinal character of the emotional experience, motivating the positing of two irreducible classes of emotional experiences
Affective science · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Emotion classification · Emotion work · Epistemology · Linguistics · Perception · Two-factor theory of emotion · Art, Aesthetics, and Perception · Communication · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Emotion
Cartesian Meditations
The Emotions
Emotions, Values, and Agency
The Contents of Visual Experience
Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?
Fearing Fictions
Emotions and Formal Objects
Emotions as Attitudes
Seeing What to Do
Ii.—what Is an Emotion ?
Imagination and the self
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination
How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?
The Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973)
Perception, Concepts, and Memory
The Authority of Affect
The emotions
Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy
Upheavals of Thought
Emotion, Fiction and Rationality
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |