Phenomenology is explanatory
Science and metascience
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21603124 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Heath Williams (0000-0002-1182-4780, School of Philosophy and Theology Faculty of Education, Philosophy and Theology, Notre Dame University Australia Fremantle Australia, corresponding author), Thomas Byrne (0000-0002-8809-3664, Department of Philosophy University of Illinois Urbana‐Champaign St. Urbana Illinois USA) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1169-1186 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12943 |
| OpenAlex | W4392355237 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 26 |
This essay disambiguates the relationship between phenomenology and explanation, whereby we uncover a fundamentally new way to understand the function of phenomenology within the sciences. These objectives are accomplished in two stages. First, we propose an original way to interpret Husserl's claim that his phenomenology is non‐explanatory. We demonstrate, contra accepted interpretations, that Husserl did not think phenomenology is non‐explanatory, because it is descriptive or because it does not deal with causes. Instead, we demonstrate that Husserl concluded that phenomenology is non‐explanatory, because it engages in a dialectical process of conceptual clarification. To substantiate this interpretation, we examine how Husserl understood the function of explanation in three different tiers of standard science and how he grasped the role of phenomenology in pure logic. Having properly clarified Husserl's conclusion—that phenomenology is non‐explanatory—we then execute our second task, namely to challenge just that idea. We argue that Husserl has—despite his claims to the contrary—de facto and inadvertently described his phenomenology as an explanatory nomological science. Our paper therefore not only clears up a longstanding misinterpretation of Husserl, but opens a new area of debate concerning the status of phenomenology within the scientific nexus
Epistemology · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology
Logic and General Theory of Science
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology
Phénoménologie de la perception
Understanding as explaining
Stuck in between. Phenomenology’s Explanatory Dilemma and its Role in Experimental Practice
A marriage of convenience - defending explanatory integration of phenomenology with mechanism. In response to Williams
Reassessing the relationship between phenomenology and explanation
The unbearable lightness of the personal, explanatory level
Phenomenology, abduction, and argument
Phenomenological explanation
Explanation, Enaction and Naturalised Phenomenology
Phenomenology
Eidetic description of consciousness, or consciousness explained in its own right
Objections to Pokropski’s proposal to marry functional mechanistic explanation with phenomenology
Smashing Husserl’s Dark Mirror
Husserl’s Theory of Scientific Explanation
Husserl on Personal Level Explanation
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time
The Evolution of Husserl’s Semiotics
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |