Intra‐mental or intra‐cranial? On Brentano's concept of immanent object

Bibliographic Data

ID21603171
AuthorsKa‐wing Leung (0000-0001-5113-826X, Department of Philosophy Sun Yat‐sen University Guangzhou China, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume29
Issue4
Pages1039-1059
Publication date2021-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12624
OpenAlexW3113074421
LanguageEN
References cited29

The aim of this paper is to elucidate Franz Brentano's concept of immanent object through his own words and from his own perspective. The prevalent account of Brentano's revival of intentionality, his initial failure to distinguish between object and content, and his wrong‐headed immanentism, is largely derived from his students. Brentano's objection to it, although well known, is seldom heeded. In fact, plenty of guidelines have been provided by Brentano himself in his writings on how his concept of immanent object is to be understood. I begin with his distinction between two senses of “object,” which, I argue, must be clearly set apart from distinction between two modes of object. I then examine three different interpretations of the term “in‐existence”: the locative, the inherentist, and the objective interpretation. In the end, after dismissing the first two interpretations, I argue that Brentano is best understood as maintaining an objective and deflationary account of mental in‐existence

Epistemology · Intentionality · Linguistics · Computer Science · Mathematics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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