Metaphors and Realities

The notion that metaphorical statements are strictly false suggests that all statements, even those that seemed 'literal', are false, as none can 'literally' reflect reality.Statements about what we perceive or could perceive rely on evoking sensory images of such 'visibles', even though we have no direct access to what others, may perceive.In addition to what is visible, we must also deal with 'invisibilia' (both the fantasms that respectable moderns now reject and the realities that lie beyond or before all sentient experience).Talking about such distant or long-ago realities must always be 'metaphorical', as they cannot have any of the merely 'subjective' properties of experience, nor do they explain those latter properties.Is there some way of confirming the brute conviction that there is a 'real and intelligible world', and that we can find it out or describe it 'literally'?May 'Reason' be a route to understanding?But this too is an illusion: we seem never in practice to escape contradictions and had perhaps better turn again to consider the worlds of experience to which we are confined.What we experience is conditioned by our imagination: whether that metaphorical imagination points beyond experience remains uncertain

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