“Epistemic Blame and Positive Epistemic Norms
On Ichikawa’s Epistemic Courage ”
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604067 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Cameron Boult (0000-0001-8488-9449, Brandon University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Pages | 1-13 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2025.2519272 |
| OpenAlex | W4411420836 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
1. This paper critically engages with Jonathan Ichikawa’s excellent book, Epistemic Courage. Ichikawa contends that many mainstream ideas about what to believe prioritize ‘negative epistemic norms’
Blame · Courage · Epistemology · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychological and Educational Research Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
Justification and the Truth-Connection
We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties
Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence
Scepticism about epistemic blame
What do We Want from a Theory of Epistemic Blame
Epistemic normativity and the justification-excuse distinction
Epistemic instrumentalism and the problem of epistemic blame
Should I believe all the truths
The Game of Belief
There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame
Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe
Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality
Eliminating epistemic rationality
Moral Dimensions
The Normativity of Rationality
Why There Are No Epistemic Duties
Epistemic Arguments for a Democratic Right to Silence
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |