Kant and Schelling on Metaphysical Disagreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604138 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Leonard Weiss (0000-0001-6857-6573, King's College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 563-584 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-19 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2024.2418599 |
| OpenAlex | W4403767690 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
This paper addresses the role of disagreement in relation to the goals of metaphysical inquiry. In particular, I will discuss two reactions to Kant’s initial observation that metaphysics does not make any lasting progress: Kant’s own demand for a critical revision of metaphysics and Schelling’s ideas as presented in his 1821 lecture On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science. Kant’s account allows for an appreciation of metaphysical conflict as a necessary precondition for a critically revised system of pure reason. However, he thinks that such a system will ultimately replace all previous ones and thereby make further development of metaphysics obsolete. Although Schelling appropriates Kant’s notion of systematicity, he arrives at a positive evaluation of metaphysical disagreement as an expression of freedom which articulates itself within the history of metaphysics. I argue that Schelling’s view also entails that the history of metaphysics is an ongoing process rather than terminating in an ultimate system or a withdrawal from metaphysical inquiry. Thus, we get to see a) that Kant himself (not just his post-Kantian successors) entertains an account of the essential historicity of reason and b) how Schelling both preserves and transforms the Kantian legacy of a philosophical history of metaphysics
Epistemology · Metaphysics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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