Melancholy as Responding to Reasons

Bibliographic Data

ID21604156
AuthorsMathea Slåttholm Sagdahl (0000-0002-2573-4479, Department of Philosophy, The Arctic University of Norway, Tromso, Norway, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume29
Issue3
Pages331-350
Publication date2021-05-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09672559.2021.1936120
OpenAlexW3178811513
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited15

This paper explores the nature and value of melancholy and the rationality of being in such a state. I defend a view of melancholy as a highly complex mood-like state. This complexity shows itself in the nature of the state itself (being at once affective, cognitive, and perceptual), its valence (involving a mix of pleasure and pain and positive and negative emotions), and its typical objects (positive and negative qualities, thematically related by their existential significance). With respect to the value and rationality of melancholy, I argue that human existence is such as to give us standing pro tanto reasons for melancholy by being an appropriate response to reality and value. However, the same reasons that count in favour of melancholy may also count against a melancholic state, once we take into account the way in which we are not only passive responders, but also agents that can respond to value through actions. I conclude that melancholy is not always a rational state, but that a full and good life must make room for melancholy

Epistemology · Existentialism · Mood · Pain and pleasure · Perception · Pleasure · Psychotherapist · Rationality · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychedelics and Drug Studies · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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