Rethinking Intentionality in Being and Time
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604215 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Aaron James Wendland (0000-0002-8556-8660, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy, Massey College, Toronto, ON, Canada, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 44-76 |
| Publication date | 2021-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2020.1851282 |
| OpenAlex | W3125386985 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
In Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity, Sacha Golob criticizes and offers an alternative to the standard interpretation of intentionality in Being and Time. According to Golob, the dominant reading’s derivation of propositional intentionality from practical intentionality fails on textual and philosophical grounds, so he develops a different approach that involves deriving propositional intentionality from prototype intentionality. In this essay, I offer an overview of dominant reading of intentionality in Being and Time and Golob’s alternative account, and then I criticize them both for attempting to derive propositional intentionality for some form of non-propositional intentionality. Finally, I offer my own ontological interpretation of intentionality by arguing that Heidegger’s aim in Being and Time is not to derive one form of intentionality from another but to describe the basic aspects of human existence that make any and all forms of intentionality possible
Epistemology · Intentionality · Linguistics · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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