Self-Knowledge of Desire
When Inference Is Not Enough
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604248 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Uku Tooming (0000-0002-4632-7979, University of Tartu, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 381-398 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108101 |
| OpenAlex | W4297047568 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 33 |
According to inferentialism about self-knowledge of desire, the basic way in which we come to know what we want is through inference. In this paper, I argue that in a wide range of cases of knowing one’s desire, inference is insufficient. In particular, I look at two inferentialist models, one proposed by Krista Lawlor and the other by Alex Byrne and look at the challenges that they face in securing safe self-ascriptions. In response to these difficulties, I argue that we can explain how inferentially based self-ascriptions can be safe when we consider the agent’s role in sustaining their desires through attending and elaborating on the content of desire through imagination
Aesthetics · Epistemology · Inference · Self-knowledge · Social science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
Imaginary Relish and Exquisite Torture
Introspection
The Concept of Mind
Authority and Estrangement
Slaves of the Passions
From imagery to intention
What asymmetry? Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, and the inferentialist challenge
A puzzle about desire
Knowing What One Wants
Knowledge Under Threat
Mind-making practices
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |