Blame as a sentiment

Bibliographic Data

ID21604262
AuthorsMarta Johansson Werkmäster (0000-0003-4990-5153, Lund University, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume30
Issue3
Pages239-253
Publication date2022-05-27
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09672559.2022.2121893
OpenAlexW4297517343
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited26

The nature of blame is not to be identified solely with a judgment, or an overt act, or an angry emotion. Instead, blame should be identified with a sentiment: more specifically, a multi-track disposition that manifests itself in various different emotions, thoughts or actions in a range of different circumstances. This paper aims to argue for these two claims. I start by arguing that blame is not solely a judgment, overt act, or an angry emotion. Then I develop the view that blame is a sentiment. In doing so, I also show how viewing blame as a sentiment avoids objections that justifies us in dismissing the previous accounts. In addition, I argue that it significantly affects other inquiries concerning blame. I end by answering a skeptical challenge that there cannot be an illuminating and unifying analysis of blame

Blame · Epistemology · Skepticism · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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Open DOIOpen Access