What We Talk about When We Talk about Truth
Dewey, Wittgenstein, and the Pragmatic Test
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604265 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Capps (0000-0002-2519-1136, Rochester Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 159-180 |
| Publication date | 2021-03-15 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2020.1871055 |
| OpenAlex | W3121708007 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 33 |
Pragmatic theories of truth need to pass the pragmatic test: they need to make a difference. Unfortunately, defenders of the pragmatic theory have rarely applied this test. I argue that a Deweyan pragmatic account of truth passes the test by identifying the political and epistemic dangers of certain types of social networks that create a durable consensus around false beliefs. To better understand Dewey’s account of truth I propose an excursion through Wittgenstein’s later views on knowledge and certainty
Epistemology · Education and Critical Thinking Development · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Epistemic Angst
An inquiry into meaning and truth
Pragmatism
The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity
The Epistemology of Democracy
The Misinformation Age
Post-Truth
Debate
Conformity in scientific networks
The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities
The Semantic Conception of Truth
Did Dewey Have a Theory of Truth
On Truth
A history of western philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
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