The A Priori
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘New Definition’
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604294 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sidra Shahid (0000-0002-3582-0733, Amsterdam University College, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 399-419 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-08 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2022.2108102 |
| OpenAlex | W4296907682 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 20 |
Despite the significant amount of debate that Merleau-Ponty’s work has seen over the years, it remains an unresolved issue whether his phenomenology offers what he announces as a ‘new definition of the a priori’. In this paper, I make a case in favor of his claim by clarifying his commitments to the a priori against two dominant lines of interpretation, naturalist and Kantian. I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s view that the sciences themselves rely on the a priori method of Wesensschau establishes his basic commitment to apriority. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the a priori differs in important respects from the Kantian a priori and its transcendental idealist ramifications because, on his view, the subject is not the unique ground of constitution. Having tackled these obstacles to understanding Merleau-Ponty’s commitments to the a priori, I argue in light of his conception of ‘radical reflection’ that rather than being a static element of experience, the a priori stands in a dynamic relation with the a posteriori as a distinctive way of articulating structures of lived experience
A priori and a posteriori · Constitution · Epistemology · Naturalism · Political science · Transcendental number · Computer Science · Law · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Science, and History
The Merleau-Ponty Dictionary
Critique of Pure Reason
Kant’s Transcendental Idealism
Phenomenology of Perception
Merleau-Ponty
Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation
Life and Mind
The primacy of perception
X—The Validity of Transcendental Arguments
The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy
Was Merleau-Ponty a ‘transcendental’ phenomenologist
Kant’s hands, spatial orientation, and the Copernican turn
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |