Legal Obligation and Ability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21604322 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Samuel Kahn (0000-0001-6597-7646, Philosophy, Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 333-350 |
| Publication date | 2024-05-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Philosophical Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0967-2559 • E-ISSN: 1466-4542 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09672559.2024.2344479 |
| OpenAlex | W4396534243 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal system, his subsequent attack on OIC fails
Epistemology · Law and economics · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Legal principles and applications · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |