The New Man in the House Rules

How the Regulation of Housing Vouchers Turns Personal Bonds Into Eviction Liabilities

Bibliographic Data

ID21633652
AuthorsRahim Kurwa (0000-0003-4033-7495, University of Illinois Chicago, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume30
Issue6
Pages926-949
Publication date2020-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueHousing Policy Debate (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1051-1482 • E-ISSN: 2152-050X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10511482.2020.1778056
OpenAlexW3046960512
LanguageEN
Citations received14
References cited45

Whereas federal aid to the poor has traditionally focused on support for families, a central contradiction in these policies is the degree to which the state employs antifamily modes of regulation and punishment, a finding consistent across welfare, health, and child services. I extend this analysis to Housing Choice Vouchers, the nation’s largest rental assistance program. Interviews with voucher renters show how, like welfare’s early man in the house rules, the public–private regulation of the program turns personal bonds into eviction liabilities. I trace these vulnerabilities to two rules: one banning unauthorized tenants from residing in the home, and another banning drug- and crime-related activity. After documenting how the enforcement of these rules forces tenants to choose between family and housing, I suggest that these dynamics illustrate similarities between the punitive regulation of housing and other safety net programs

Business · Economics · Enforcement · Eviction · Political science · Public economics · Punitive damages · Renting · Voucher · Welfare · Homelessness and Social Issues · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Law · Psychology · Urban, Neighborhood, and Segregation Studies

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