Aslak Rostad. Human Transgression—Divine Retribution

Aslak Rostad, Associate Professor of Classics at Norwegian University of Technology and Science in Trondheim, presents here his revised dissertation, submitted to the University of Bergen in 2006, which investigates the Lydian and Phrygian confession inscriptions with the aim of considering “how the ancient world dealt with religious transgressions” (p. 4). Rostad had suggested to call these inscriptions “reconciliation inscriptions” (“Confession or Reconciliation? The Narrative Structure of the Lydian and Phrygian ‘Confession Inscriptions,’” Symbolae Osloenses 77, 2002, 145–64) in an attempt to translate the term “Sühne-Inschriften” used by Franz S. Steinleitner in 1913, but now accepts the suggestion of C. E. Arnold that “propitiatory” or “appeasement inscriptions” would be a better term (pp. 8–9, with reference to C. E. Arnold, NTS 51, 2005, 433). The basis for Rostad’s comparison of these inscriptions with Greek cultic regulations are forty texts collected by Franciszek Sokolowski (Lois sacrées de l’Asie Mineure; Lois sacrées des cités grecques. Supplément; Lois sacrées des cités grecques, Paris: Boccard, 1955/1962/1969), and a few texts from Eran Lupu, Greek Sacred Law: A Collection of New Documents, Leiden: Brill, 2005, all (re-)printed, with translation, in Appendix A (pp. 171–202). The twenty-nine confession inscriptions that Rostad discusses in some detail are taken from Georg Petzl, Die Beichtinschriften Westkleinasiens (Bonn: Habelt, 1994), reprinted, with translation, in Appendix B (pp. 203–18). Both text corpora are presented without a critical apparatus and without consideration of new readings or restorations of inscriptions (pp. 10–11; these are discussed, at times, in footnotes during the discussion), which is justified with the statement that “[t]his is not an epigraphic study proper” (p. 10). Considering that over 60 years have passed since the publication of Sokolowski’s first volume, and over twenty-five years since the publication of Petzl’s collection, it surely would have been helpful to have a new critical edition of the sixty-nine inscriptions which form the basis of the study.After discussing preliminary matters in part 1 (pp. 3–12), Rostad explains in part 2 the propitiatory inscriptions in terms of their content, structure, notions about the gods, their religious context in Lydia and Phrygia, and previous research on the propitiatory inscriptions (pp. 15–53). Part 3 is the heart of the dissertation: ch. 5 describes Greek cultic morality (pp. 57–82), ch. 6 prohibitions and punishments in Greek cultic regulations (pp. 83–120), and ch. 8 the transgressions in the propitiatory inscriptions (pp. 121–52). Part 4, which consists of ch.8, presents the conclusions (pp. 155–68). Part 5 consists of the two appendixes already mentioned. The book concludes with the bibliography, an “index of citations” (of the inscriptions included in Appendix A and B, not of all primary sources), and a general index.In his survey of research, Rostad presents the contributions of Marijana Ricl, Hans-Josef Klauck, Eckhard Schnabel, Clinton Arnold, Angelos Chaniotis, and Richard Gordon, whose narrative analyses Rostad regards as one of the most important contributions, citing Gordon’s conclusion that the institution of the confession stela represent a means of negotiation not with the god (who was only an afterthought) but with the implied reader and thus indirectly with the real community, with the decisive suggestion that the perpetrator had acted out of ignorance (“Raising a Sceptre: Confession-Narratives from Lydia and Phrygia,” JRA 17, 2004, 177–196, here p. 193; cf. Rostad, p. 51). Given that fourteen years have passed between the dissertation (2006) and the preparation of the revised version (published in 2020), it is surprising that Rostad states that he was not able to include any of the new confession texts in the collection of Hasan Malay and Georg Petzl (2017, reviewed in BBR 28.2, 2018, 355–57), nor interact with the publications of Nicole Belayche (2003, 2006, 2007), Laura Boffo (2004), Angelos Chaniotis (2004, 2009), María Paz de Hoz (2006), Arminda Lozano (2007).Rostad develops the concept of “cultic morality,” which he describes as “an ideal code of behavior that the worshiper was expected to submit to when he or she took part in ritual and cultic activities” (p. 59), a notion restricted to the cult, intended for special occasions, marking “a distance from everyday life” (p. 59, following H. S. Versnel) and thus distinct from “piety” (εὐσέβεια), which involved all parts of life (p. 60). The two most important aspects of cultic morality are the creation of sacred space and the maintenance of ritual purity (pp. 67–81). Rostad provides a general survey that is not confined to a particular historical period (p. 61). He builds his conclusions from selected contributions by scholars whose positions his summarizes. He concludes that the purpose of social control in cultic morality was not so much to avoid actions and behavior that threaten the community, but “to create a code for evaluation of behavior” which is a matter not of “what is done” but “how successfully behaviour is defined” (p. 82).It is in the discussion of prohibitions and punishments that Rostad begins to discuss primary sources regarding cultic regulations. He is skeptical that a classification of the entire texts that Sokolowski called “règlement” or regulations is useful, suggesting instead a classification of the “rules” that appear in the cultic regulations: (1) rules for admission to the shrine, (2) rules for the sacrificial rites, and (3) rules for the rights and duties of the priests (p. 87). Since he intends to analyze “the special variety of cultic morality” found in the propitiatory inscriptions, he focuses in what follows on cultic regulations which contain rules analogous to the transgressions described in these inscriptions (p. 88). These are, specifically, prohibitions against entry into sacred precincts and against impurity, general purity rules, detailed purity rules (related to death, birth, sexual activity, diet, clothes, weapons, jewelry, domestic animals), damage to sacred property, civil punishments (fines, corporal punishment, rituals as punishments) and divine punishments (usually in the form of a curse). The cultic rules are intended “to secure proper conduct and behavior within the sacred sphere;” the issues are essentially ritual purity and the protection of sacred property (p. 118). The cultic rules can be called “markers of suitability for worship”—unlike the commandments and prohibitions of the Pentateuch, they were neither understood nor practiced as a “general mode of life” (p. 119). This can be seen in the fact that while impurity was regarded as a serious matter, their observation was left to the worshipper, and punishment was not carried out by the civil authorities.In his discussion of transgression (ἁμαρτία, ἁμάρτημα, παραβαίνω) in the propitiatory inscriptions, Rostad develops a classification in three main categories (p. 124; Petzl: 8; Klauck: 4; Chaniotis: 7; Gordon: 2): (1) Violations of cultic rules, with three sub-categories: transgressions of purity rules (pp. 126–36), violation of sacred property (groves, trees, objects; pp. 136–39), and neglect of religious duty (e.g., failing to honor a god’s powers by raising a stele after the fulfilment of a wish; pp. 139–44); (2) judicial prayers (abolishment of curses, recordings of fulfilled judicial prayers and curses, pp. 145–48); (3) oaths, that is, perjury (pp. 148–50). Rostad concludes that the propitiatory inscriptions confirm that ritual impurity was “an elusive entity which cannot be immediately identified” and that the code of purity was not imposed on worshippers outside a cultic context to create “a general mode of life” as in Semitic or Jewish rules of purity (pp. 135, 136). The main religious transgression described in the propitiatory inscriptions occurs when a person considered impure, a status that seems not to been regarded by itself as a transgression, enters the sacred precinct attached to a shrine or temple (p. 135).One of Rostad’s main conclusions is that the propitiatory inscriptions originate in human conflicts that were elevated through the practice of judicial prayers “into matters between man and god” rather in a judicial system ruled by priests (p. 166). Rostad rejects the various attempts to explain the origin of the propitiatory inscriptions as based on assumptions (p. 167). C. E. Arnold, who suggests that the harsh religious ideology evident in the propitiatory inscriptions may explain why Paul’s proclamation of a merciful God and the forgiveness of sins found an attentive audience (cf. p. 49), does not suggest an origin for the propitiatory inscriptions and thus should not be included among the scholars Rostad critiques. As to my suggestion that the confession inscriptions may originate in the need of local priests to reconsolidate their authority in view of the rise of Christianity in Asia Minor (“Divine Tyranny and Public Humiliation,” NovT 45, 2003, 160–88), it is correct that this cannot be proven from the texts, a fact that I acknowledge (ibid., p. 187).Rostad, in turn, should acknowledge that his conclusions are, at least in part, equally speculative, e.g., when he asserts that the propitiatory inscriptions “probably” do not reflect a harsh religious ideology in Lydia and Phrygia (p. 162); that they were “probably” erected only in desperate situations when other means had failed (p. 163); that the priests “probably” interpreted the oracles and negotiated with the transgressors (p. 163); that the person dedicating the stele did not confess the transgression but admitted the performance of the forbidden act or the participation in the events preceding a binding spell, and then “probably” offered some sacrifice, performed cleansing rites, or paid money (p. 164); that human conflicts “probably” were significant in inscriptions in which the transgression is a religious offense even though “there is no clear evidence” (p. 165). If Rostad is correct in his assumption that many of the propitiatory inscriptions do not tell the full story (p. 165), which I think he is, then there is room for plausible speculation about the Sitz im Leben of these inscriptions which are unique in the Greek and Roman world. Thus, Rostad is surely correct to note that the origin of the propitiatory inscriptions “may be sought in the meeting and intermingling of several religious traditions” and to conclude that his analysis has demonstrated again that “Greco-Roman pagan religion” was “a complex pattern of beliefs and rituals” (p. 168). However, to state that whether the religious practice of the propitiatory inscriptions were influenced by Geek, Jewish, Christian, or “Oriental” trends “is irrelevant to our understanding of them” (ibid.) is surprising, as this seems to call into question his interpretation of the propitiatory inscriptions (ch. 7) in the context of Greek cultic morality (Chapter 5) and the prohibitions and punishments in Greek cultic regulations (ch. 6). It is to Rostad’s credit that he has interpreted the propitiatory inscriptions in this religious context, rather than treating them as a completely isolated phenomenon (although some may question of wisdom of largely ignoring the date and the geography of the texts that he adduces for Greek religiosity). His explanation of the propitiatory inscriptions in terms of an elevation of conflicts between human beings to the level of a religious conflict between the transgressor and a god would have benefitted from an in-depth analysis of the available evidence for human conflicts in the cities and villages of Asia Minor (in which the propitiatory inscriptions were erected). All in all, Rostad’s study is not only an excellent treatise in the genre of dissertations but also a valuable contribution to the intersection of Greek cults and Greek morality with some side glances into Roman religiosity and civil discourse in general and to the propitiatory or confession inscriptions in particular

Archaeology · Art · Criminology · Economic Justice · Literature · Political science · Retributive justice · Ancient Near East History · Biblical Studies and Interpretation · Classical Antiquity Studies · History · Law · Psychology