The Paradox of Death and Subjectivity

In this paper I examine the paradox of human subjectivity in light of the tension between two forms of approaching subjectivity (as transcendental subject or as empirical being) along with two other paradoxes that, I will argue, are also the expression of the larger tension between first-personal and third-personal accounts of experience. One is the “crazy paradox” Merleau-Ponty points to in his analyses of Husserl’s reflection on the notion of Earth as ground in the text “The originary ark, the Earth, does not move”. The other is the paradox of death, that consists of the contradictory understanding of my own death as being certain yet unconstitutable. I present a brief description of Husserl’s developments on death and argue that its peculiarities present a challenge for the phenomenological method as a whole, and for the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and the empirical human being; then I offer a preliminary analysis of the Merleau-Pontian diagnosis of Husserl’s philosophy as well as Merleau-Ponty’s own way out of the paradox, and point out some of its insufficiencies

Epistemology · Subjectivity · Transcendental idealism · Transcendental number · Transcendental philosophy · Computer Science · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism

• Trauma y aborto de sentido

  Open Access•Bryan Francisco Zúñiga Iturra, Bryan Zúñiga Iturra•Ideas y Valores•2025

  Add to list