Must Scientific Realists Respond to The Challenge of the PMI

Bibliographic Data

ID21665950
AuthorsZoltán Vecsey (0000-0001-7502-7548, Center for Applied Linguistics, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume47
Issue1
Pages3-20
Publication date2025-06-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTeorie vědy / Theory of Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1210-0250 • E-ISSN: 1804-6347
PublisherInstitute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.46938/tv.2024.639
OpenAlexW4404038635
LanguageEN
References cited25

The Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI) says that because most past scientific theories turned out to be false, we have no reason to believe in the truthfulness of our current scientific theories. According to current consensus, this anti-realist argument presents a serious challenge to which proponents of the realist conception of science must give a response. In accordance with this requirement, some scientific realists try to demonstrate that PMI is a fallacious argument. Other realists make an attempt to block the pessimistic conclusion. The present paper offers a new perspective on the debate between scientific anti-realists and traditional scientific realists. The main argument consists of two interrelated steps. First, a structural analysis of the dialectical status of PMI is provided demonstrating that the anti-realists’ argument is internally unstable. Second, it is argued, on that basis, that an internally unstable argument like the PMI does not require any strategic response from the opponents’ side. This suggests that the consensus view is wrong: scientific realists need not respond to the challenge of PMI

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