Constitutional Law and the Limits of Rawlsian Liberty
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21687129 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gillian Sinnott (Harvard University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 124-155 |
| Publication date | 2020-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legal Theory (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1352-3252 • E-ISSN: 1469-8048 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s1352325220000178 |
| OpenAlex | W3094603579 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 3 |
This paper examines the scope of John Rawls's theory of liberty. It first develops an account of how this theory, which Rawls presents in largely abstract terms, applies in specific cases. It then argues that this account reveals that the scope of Rawls's theory of liberty is surprisingly narrow and that it does not include such seemingly obvious liberal rights as the freedom to engage in the sexual behavior of one's choice or to have access to pornography
Classical liberalism · Law and economics · Liberalism · Negative liberty · Political science · Politics · Pornography · Sociology · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |