Cooperation and the management of local common resources in remote rural communities

It is widely recognized that local management of common pool resources can be more efficient and more effective than private markets or top-down government management, especially in remote rural communities in which the institutions may be weak or prone to elite capture. In this paper, we explore the propensity for cooperation in the management of local common resources by introducing a variant of a public goods game among remote rural communities in the state of Odisha, in eastern India. We explore various patterns of cooperation, including free riding behaviour, unconditional cooperation and conditional cooperation, in which individuals’ propensity toward cooperation is tied to their beliefs about the level of cooperation among their peers. We find that a significant portion of our sample fall into this latter category, but also that their expectations about the level of contributions among their peers are somewhat malleable

Common-pool resource · Elite · Local government · Public good · Community Development and Social Impact · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare

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