Shame, Love, and Morality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21700844 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fredrik Westerlund (0000-0002-4767-4868, University of Jyväskylä, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 517-541 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1382-4554 • E-ISSN: 1572-8609 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s10892-022-09402-9 |
| OpenAlex | W4294308125 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 37 |
This article offers a new account of the moral substance of shame. Through careful reflection on the motives and intentional structure of shame, I defend the claim that shame is an egocentric and morally blind emotion. I argue that shame is rooted in our desire for social affirmation and constituted by our ability to sense how we appear to others. What makes shame egocentric is that in shame we are essentially concerned about our own social worth and pained by the perception of our self as socially worthless. In itself, shame entails no morally pertinent concern about others or understanding of what is morally significant. I contrast shame with the possibility of relating to others—and to oneself—with love and care. Indeed, I propose that love is essential for moral understanding and motivation. The argument of the article unfolds through critical appraisals of the main strategies for defending the moral value of shame. First, against the claim that shame entails respect for others, I argue that shame's sensitivity to the opinions of others is motivated by egocentric self-concern. Second, against the view that shame over failures to live up to moral values is morally valuable, I argue that regardless of whether the values guiding our shame are moral or not, the perspective of shame is oblivious to their moral meaning. Third, against the claim that shame is crucial for self-understanding, I argue that the desire for affirmation that drives shame is a powerful source of self-deception
Epistemology · Morality · Psychotherapist · Shame · Emotional Labor in Professions · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Social Influence · Social Psychology
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword
Merit and responsibility
Emotions and Violence
Others in Mind
Emotions
Proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, and psychopathology.
Participant descriptions of guilt and shame
A Theory of Justice
Differentiating shame from guilt
Self and Other
Empathy, Shame, Guilt, and Narratives of Interpersonal Conflicts
Natural Pride and Natural Shame
The Descent of Shame1
Guilt, Shame, and Morality
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings
Shame and Necessity
Assessing individual differences in constructive versus destructive responses to anger across the lifespan
Human Nature and the Social Order
Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomena
Moral affect
The Greeks and the Irrational
Shame in Self and Society
Shame and the Social Bond
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |