Beyond the Moral Influence Theory? A Critical Examination of Vargas’s Agency Cultivation Model of Responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID21700903
AuthorsHarry Harland (0000-0002-5787-9330, University of Cambridge, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume24
Issue4
Pages401-425
Publication date2020-12-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1382-4554 • E-ISSN: 1572-8609
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10892-020-09328-0
OpenAlexW3010006475
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited32

This paper repudiates Manuel Vargas’s attempt to supplant the traditional moral influence theory of responsibility (MIT) with his ‘agency cultivation model’ (ACM). By focusing on fostering responsiveness to moral considerations, ACM purports to avoid the chief pitfalls of MIT. However, I contend that ACM is far less distinctive than it initially appears and so possesses all of MIT’s defects. I also assail Vargas’s counterfactual test for assessing whether a wrongdoer can respond to moral considerations. It is argued that the counterfactual test is epistemically redundant because it can only be fleshed out once we have settled the issues it is supposed to resolve. Moreover, it tacitly inverts the relation between freedom and responsibility—we cannot attribute free will to wrongdoers unless we have already established their blameworthiness. The upshot of this is that enquiries into an agent’s freedom are irrelevant to the ethics of holding her responsible

Compatibilism · Counterfactual thinking · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Experimental philosophy · Law and economics · Moral agency · Moral responsibility · Philosophical methodology · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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