Debt and Desert

Bibliographic Data

ID21700935
AuthorsAndreas Brekke Carlsson (0000-0001-8612-9611, University of Inland Norway, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume28
Issue4
Pages673-694
Publication date2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1382-4554 • E-ISSN: 1572-8609
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10892-024-09485-6
OpenAlexW4401082855
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited50

According to what may be called the Debt Model, blameworthiness is defined in terms of deserved suffering. The Debt Model has a significant implication: one is less blameworthy if one has experienced some of the suffering one deserves, and no longer blameworthy once one has experienced the full amount of suffering one deserves. Blameworthiness, according to the Debt model, is not forever. In recent papers, Clarke (2022) and Howard (2022) independently criticize the Debt Model and argue for the opposite conclusion: if one is blameworthy, one will remain blameworthy forever. In this paper, I respond to this criticism as well as a recent argument against the Debt Model from Tierney (2022). I then present a prima facie case for the Debt Model. I argue that Clarke’s attempt to accommodate the intuitions elicited by this and similar cases has unwelcome implications. I will end the paper with some remarks about what roles we want our conceptions of blameworthiness to play. If Clarke’s account were right, the fact that an agent is blameworthy would play a far less significant role in our moral life than we often tend to assume. The Debt Model, I will suggest, makes better sense of our blaming practices

Debt · Economics · Epistemology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Finance

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