Putting Things Into (Rational) Perspective

Normative Reasons and Their Rational Accessibility

Bibliographic Data

ID21701625
AuthorsM Jahn (0000-0002-6333-6025, Stockholm University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume29
Issue1
Pages227-249
Publication date2026-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-025-10530-y
OpenAlexW4416899869
LanguageEN
References cited20

Perspectivism about reasons is commonly understood as the view that normative reasons depend on an agent’s epistemic perspective: a fact counts as a reason only if it is epistemically accessible to the agent. This paper argues that perspectivists’ near-exclusive focus on an agent’s epistemic perspective obscures another important dimension of perspective dependence – namely, that reasons can also depend on an agent’s rational perspective. Specifically, I propose that, in addition to epistemic accessibility, a further necessary condition for a fact to qualify as a reason is its rational accessibility – that is, the agent must have decisive reason to access the fact. Recognizing the rational accessibility of reasons offers considerable theoretical leverage: it substantially improves the two leading perspectivist accounts, with notable implications for the broader dialectic, and it promises to illuminate central normative phenomena, such as key instances of normative latitude

Normative · Ontology · Philosophy of medicine · Political philosophy · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access