If Nudges Treat their Targets as Rational Agents, Nonconsensual Neurointerventions Can Too

Bibliographic Data

ID21701723
AuthorsThomas Douglas (0000-0002-6788-3608, University of Oxford, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume25
Issue2
Pages369-384
Publication date2022-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-022-10285-w
OpenAlexW4221069644
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited30

Andreas Schmidt and Neil Levy have recently defended nudging against the objection that nudges fail to treat nudgees as rational agents. Schmidt rejects two theses that have been taken to support the objection: that nudges harness irrational processes in the nudgee, and that they subvert the nudgee’s rationality. Levy rejects a third thesis that may support the objection: that nudges fail to give reasons. I argue that these defences can be extrapolated from nudges to some nonconsensual neurointerventions; if Schmidt’s and Levy’s defences succeed, then some nonconsensual neurointerventions neither harness irrationality, nor subvert rationality, nor fail to give reasons. This, I claim, poses a challenge both to opponents of nonconsensual neurointerventions, and to defenders of nudging

Economics · Epistemology · Irrational number · Irrationality · Law and economics · Nudge theory · Philosophy of medicine · Political science · Positive economics · Rationality · Free Will and Agency · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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