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Is Rational Manipulation Permissible

Bibliographic Data

ID21701944
AuthorsHugh Breakey (0000-0002-5170-2091, Griffith University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume28
Issue3
Pages379-396
Publication date2025-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-023-10382-4
OpenAlexW4328114215
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited27

Rational manipulation is constituted by the following conditions: (i) A aims to persuade B of thesis X; (ii) A holds X to be true and rationally justifiable; (iii) A knows of the existence of evidence, argument or information Y. While Y is not itself misinformation (Y is factually correct), A suspects B might take Y as important evidence for not-X; (iv) A deliberately chooses not to mention Y to B, out of a concern that it could mislead B into believing not-X; and, (v) B has no compelling reason to expect A will avoid mentioning Y in this way. A’s behavior is rational insofar as A aims to use reasons to persuade B to believe a thesis that A holds as true and justified. Yet it is manipulation because A deliberately avoids furnishing B with information that B might regard as relevant, to ensure B arrives at the correct belief. I argue that we have good reason to think that A’s action will be wrongly manipulative because it disrespects B’s consent, epistemic autonomy, and personal autonomy. That said, context is critical, and there are many times evidence is intentionally occluded that are not rational manipulation. Even so, ethical arguers should beware of ambiguous contexts, such as when there are conflicting expectations about argumentation roles and goals

Argumentation theory · Autonomy · Epistemology · Law and economics · Misinformation · Philosophy of medicine · Political science · Rational agent · Rationality · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Medicine · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology

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    Marianna B Ganapini•Inquiry•2026

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  • Public Misunderstanding of Science? Reframing the Problem of Vaccine Hesitancy

    Maya J Goldenberg•Perspectives on Science•2016

  • The Beneficent Nudge Program and Epistemic Injustice

    Open Access•Evan Riley•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2017

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  • Nudging and Manipulation

    Open Access•T M Wilkinson, Timothy D Wilkinson•Political Studies•2013

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Citations per year1
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Highly citedNo

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