Blame for me and Not for Thee

Status Sensitivity and Moral Responsibility

Bibliographic Data

ID21701979
AuthorsHenry Argetsinger (0000-0001-5184-6338, University of California San Diego, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume25
Issue2
Pages265-282
Publication date2022-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthical Theory and Moral Practice (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-2820 • E-ISSN: 1572-8447
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10677-022-10274-z
OpenAlexW4210752250
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited49

In our day-to-day lives, we form responsibility judgements about one another – but we are imperfect beings, and our judgments can be mistaken. This paper suggests that we get things wrong not merely by chance, but predictably and systematically. In particular, these miscues are common when we are dealing with large gaps in social status and power. That is, when we form judgements about those who are much more or less socially powerful than ourselves, it is increasingly likely that “epistemic distorters” will reliably disrupt our reasoning. In response to this situation, I argue for the introduction of a new norm concerning blame and social status: “Powerful Restraint.” This norm suggests that the socially powerful ought to blame the socially dispossessed less frequently, and that social pressure be applied to achieve that compliance. I argue that such a norm is justified given the pernicious down-stream moral effects of the up-stream epistemic distortion I describe. I defend it against objections that it suggests a normative solution to an epistemic problem, that it is paternalistic, and that it involves a kind of disrespect to the less socially powerful

Blame · Epistemology · Imperfect · Normative · Political science · Social responsibility · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology

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