Is the replication crisis a base-rate fallacy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21702380 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bengt Autzen (0000-0001-5487-4764, University College Cork, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 5-6 |
| Pages | 233-243 |
| Publication date | 2021-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Metamedicine (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0166-2031 • E-ISSN: 1573-1200 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11017-022-09561-8 |
| PMID | 35220515 |
| OpenAlex | W4214624990 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 21 |
Is science in the midst of a crisis of replicability and false discoveries? In a recent article, Alexander Bird offers an explanation for the apparent lack of replicability in the biomedical sciences. Bird argues that the surprise at the failure to replicate biomedical research is a result of the fallacy of neglecting the base rate. The base-rate fallacy arises in situations in which one ignores the base rate—or prior probability—of an event when assessing the probability of this event in the light of some observed evidence. By extension, the replication crisis would result from ignoring the low prior probability of biomedical hypotheses. In this paper, my response to Bird’s claim is twofold. First, I show that the argument according to which the replication crisis is due to the low prior of biomedical hypotheses is incomplete. Second, I claim that a simple base-rate fallacy model does not account for some important methodological insights that have emerged in discussions of the replication crisis
Biology · Economics · Epistemology · Fallacy · Positive economics · Statistics · Surprise · Mathematics · Meta-analysis and systematic reviews · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Statistical Methods in Clinical Trials
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |