Bringing transparency to the de se debates
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21702789 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ekain Garmendia-Mujika (0000-0001-6708-4323, ILCLI – Department of Philosophy, University of the Basque Country (EHU/UPV), Donostia, Spain, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 315-332 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2024.2361162 |
| OpenAlex | W4399215999 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
There has been much discussion over the last decade between so-called ‘de se skeptics’ and ‘de se exceptionalists’. The debate concerns claims made by John Perry and David Lewis in 1979 on the basis of some now-famous examples they introduced. In this paper, I argue that different problems and questions have commonly been conflated when approaching these issues, and I reframe the whole debate by appealing to two theses on the transparency of mental content that have been widely overlooked. These theses are essential components of the view challenged by Perry and Lewis and are indispensable for understanding the proper nature of the debates and positions in the literature. After distinguishing among three frequently conflated questions, I conclude that Perry’s and Lewis’s examples indeed present a problem for the view they were targeting, but this is not necessarily related to self-locating thoughts or indexical expressions. I also argue that our commitments to potential ‘de se thoughts’ are contingent on our positions regarding the transparency theses. I conclude the paper by exploring the prospects of an approach that, unlike most proposed views, completely abandons the idea that thoughts are relations between agents and contents
Epistemology · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|