Comparing deterministic agents
A new argument for compatibilism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21702807 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marcela Herdova (0000-0002-5724-532X, Florida State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 106-121 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2023.2259403 |
| OpenAlex | W4386913404 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 23 |
This paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism
Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Moral responsibility · Thought experiment · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
New essays in philosophical theology
Responsibility and Control
Causation and Free Will
Building Better Beings
Free Will and Luck
Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Freedom within Reason
Are we free to break the laws
A Hard‐line Reply to the Multiple‐Case Manipulation Argument
Reflection and Responsibility
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |