How simple is the Humean Theory of Motivation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21702813 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Olof Leffler (0000-0001-9073-2552, University of Vienna, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 125-140 |
| Publication date | 2022-05-04 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Explorations (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13869795.2022.2051591 |
| OpenAlex | W4220695984 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 15 |
In recent discussions of the Humean Theory of Motivation (HTM), several authors – not to mention other philosophers around the proverbial water cooler – have appealed to the simplicity of the theory to defend it. But the argument from simplicity has rarely been explicated or received much critical attention – until now. I begin by reconstructing the argument and then argue that it suffers from a number of problems. Most importantly, first, I argue that HTM is unlikely to be simpler than even close competing theories, and second, it is unlikely that a plausible version of the theory will be very simple. Moreover, I argue that a convincing case for HTM is likely to have to show that it is more virtuous than defenders have done so far
Epistemology · Simplicity · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2025 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |