A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’

Bibliographic Data

ID21702823
AuthorsTom Frankfort (0000-0001-8634-344X, University of London, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume27
Issue3
Pages251-261
Publication date2024-09-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Explorations (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13869795.2023.2291583
OpenAlexW4390790960
LanguageEN
References cited21

Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and then say it. One way to argue for the thesis is to show that the content of a token thought cannot be fully represented by a token mental state before the production of the utterance which expresses it. I make an argument for that claim based on speech act theory. Many inner speech utterances are inner speech acts; as such they are individuated by an amalgam of semantic content and illocutionary force, which only come together with the performance of the speech act. Call the performance of a speech act its meaning and call its meaning its content. Since a token thought is individuated by its content it follows that the content of the speech act is not represented by any token mental state before the speech act is performed. Metaphysically, a thought, when it is an inner speech act, is not an object of any kind, but an action – the action of performing the speech act. I illustrate my argument with the action of deciding something

Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Utterance · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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