Is moral status done with words

A reply to Coeckelbergh’s performative view of moral status

Bibliographic Data

ID21703392
AuthorsMiriam Gorr (0000-0003-1654-1111, Technische Universität Dresden, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume26
Issue1
Publication date2024-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEthics and Information Technology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1388-1957 • E-ISSN: 1572-8439
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s10676-024-09748-8
OpenAlexW4391574389
LanguageEN
References cited27

This paper critically examines Coeckelbergh’s (2023) performative view of moral status. Drawing parallels to Searle’s social ontology, two key claims of the performative view are identified: (1) Making a moral status claim is equivalent to making a moral status declaration. (2) A successful declaration establishes the institutional fact that the entity has moral status. Closer examination, however, reveals flaws in both claims. The second claim faces a dilemma: individual instances of moral status declaration are likely to fail because they do not conform to established moral discourse conventions, and reliance on declarations becomes both unnecessary and implausible for explaining widespread collective recognition of moral status. As for the first claim, accepting it undermines the potential for meaningful moral disagreement. As a remedy, this paper proposed a shift in perspective: interpreting moral status claims as assertions rather than declarations. This refined perspective provides a more plausible framework for understanding moral status and avoids the pitfalls associated with the performative view

Epistemology · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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