Against Being For
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21749007 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James M Brown (0000-0001-7636-4554, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author), James B Brown (0000-0002-7262-1629) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2022-10-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061 |
| Publisher | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.26556/vatkh848 |
| OpenAlex | W4388309033 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 4 |
Expressivism is the view that normative claims express nondescriptive, practical attitudes. It is widely assumed that this involves denying that normative claims express beliefs, except in a minimal or deflationary sense. However, this assumption is increasingly being called into question. Instead, it is argued, expressivists can and should provide a robust, nondescriptive theory of belief in general which can explain the difference between ordinary descriptive beliefs and nondescriptive normative beliefs. This paper examines one such an attempt due to Mark Schroeder who provides a theory of belief as being for. I argue that the theory fails to deliver on its primary aim: to distinguish between descriptive and nondescriptive beliefs. Accordingly, I conclude that the theory should be rejected as it stands
Epistemology · Expressivism · Normative · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |