What does pleasure want

Bibliographic Data

ID21751125
AuthorsUku Tooming (0000-0002-4632-7979, University of Tartu, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume24
Issue2
Pages437-453
Publication date2025-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1568-7759 • E-ISSN: 1572-8676
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11097-022-09884-w
OpenAlexW4312106313
LanguageEN
References cited26

Some philosophers and psychologists share an assumption that pleasure is by nature such that when an experience is pleasurable, an agent is motivated to continue having that experience. In this paper, I dispute this assumption. First, I point out how it does not make sense of the wanting-liking distinction in motivational neuroscience. Second, I present as a counterexample what I call’dynamic pleasure’ which does not motivate retaining one’s focus on the object of original experience but motivates an exploration of other options instead. Third, as another counterexample, I bring out pleasures of relief which are bound to pass when one’s discomfort is removed and in which case it is reasonable to assume that there is no motivation to maintain them. Fourth, I appeal to phenomenology of pleasure and argue that many experiences have a temporal shape which is in conflict with the self-maintenance assumption. As an example, I use the pleasure in listening to a song. The conclusion of the paper is that we should reject the self-maintenance assumption and consider seriously pluralism about the motivational structure of pleasure

Active listening · Aesthetics · Appeal · Cognitive psychology · Counterexample · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Pleasure · Pleasure principle · Communication · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Law · Pain Management and Placebo Effect · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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